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A B S T R A C T
Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a
number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the the-
ory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether
this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition
from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offer by PP theorists mostly
concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness un-
touched.
1. Introduction
Predictive processing (PP) is currently one of the most debated the-
ories of brain function. The theory pictures the brain as a hypothe-
sis testing machine matching perceptual hypotheses (priors or prior be-
liefs) generated by an internal hierarchical model with inputs coming
through sensory channels. Hypotheses of the internal model are based
on learning as well as “hard-wired” evolutionary constraints (Otten et
al., 2017). The mismatch between a hypothesis and the sensory input
amounts to “prediction error”. Such a mismatch is propagated higher up
the hierarchy of the model, until higher-level hypotheses are adjusted
accordingly. This process of prediction error minimization (PEM) is con-
currently running in the brain on multiple time scales, at various stages
of the perceptual hierarchy and in various brain regions where the parts
of the internal model are embedded. Organisms capable of acting are not
bound to constant passive updating of their internal models. They can
act on the world, thus actively changing sensory inputs to match them
with aspects of the internal model (“active inference”; see Parr et al.,
2019).
A lot of hope is currently put into the PP theory. For instance, un-
der the pressure of current fashion, deep brain networks are being re-
developed along the lines of the PP models (Dora et al., 2018; Lot-
ter et al., 2017). There is also work in progress on the PP analysis of
meta-awareness and higher order cognition (Fleming, 2019; Fleming
& Daw, 2017). Symptoms that accompany psychosis, such as delusions
and hallucinations, are now being reconsidered in light of current PP
theories (Adams et al., 2014; Corlett et al., 2019; Sterzer et al.,
2018). Influence of the approach can also be documented by recent at-
tempts to re-interpret the significance of neuronal activations captured
by fMRI scans (Alink et al., 2010) and the function of EEG oscillations
(Heilbron & Chait, 2018) under the prism of the PP theory. Philoso-
phers and neuroscientists increasingly assume that PP will explain per-
ception (Hohwy et al., 2008), attention (Feldman & Friston, 2010)
and action (Clark, 2013) in a systematic and unified manner.
In short, in some quarters, PP is expected to become the global the-
ory of brain function (Friston, 2010). This zeal should be somewhat
tempered by the fact that many contemporary neurobiological models
of perception and cognition do not work with predictive architectures.
Not just that: some theorists are openly sceptical, claiming either that
there is no evidence for prediction error architecture in the obtained
data (Kogo & Trengove, 2015; Philips et al., 2018, p. 8) or that the
brain cannot perform the operations hypothesized by the PP theorists
(Purves et al., 2015). Other authors embrace some of the PP ideas but
accord neural predictions only a limited role in their accounts of brain
function (Bullier, 2006; Heeger, 2017). Despite these unsettled ques-
tions, the broadness of its explanatory scope, combined with the relative
simplicity of its explanatory principles, make the PP theory attractive for
many theorists and disciplines.
Must the PP theory explain perceptual consciousness as well?1 Con-
scious states represent a large part of an agent's mental life and unfold
differently from the non-conscious ones. If PP indeed aspires to be an
all-encompassing theory of the brain, to explain “perception and action
and everything mental in between” (Hohwy, 2013, p. 1), explanation
of consciousness is to be expected from PP proponents. Of course, the
PP theory might be taken less ambitiously. For example, it might be
taken just as a theory of information flow in cortical circuits which con-
forms to some first principle assumptions about living systems, such as
the free energy principle. Such a theory need not aspire to explain the
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difference between conscious and unconscious processing, while still be-
ing theoretically exciting. As a matter of fact, though, some authors
working in the PP framework advertise PP as a theory that contributes
to the general explanation of consciousness. Sometimes it is a matter of
indirect but telling hints. Recall Hohwy's remark that PP is expected to
explain perception and action and everything mental in between. Pre-
sumably, when speaking of perception he intends to cover the cases of
conscious perception as well, not exclusively the instances of unconscious
perception. This is confirmed by Hohwy's other published statements,
such as his remark that the PP account of binocular rivalry he devel-
oped with Roepstorff and Friston “furnishes the first PP approach to vi-
sual consciousness” (Hohwy, 2020, p. 7; emphasis in the original), or
that we can “discover aspects of consciousness in a general account of
brain function” offered by PP (Hohwy, 2015, p. 321). Other authors
do not invoke PP's aspiration to become the general account of brain
function, but simply proceed to state that PP delivers a new theory of
conscious perception. Hobson and Friston (2014, p. 22) boldly assert
that consciousness “is not a hard thing to understand, describe, or make
hypotheses about — if one associates it with inference based on deeply
structured hierarchical (probabilistic) beliefs about sensations”; Wiese
and Metzinger (2017, p. 2) claim that if the PP theory is on the right
track, “it may provide the means to build new conceptual bridges be-
tween theoretical and empirical work on cognition and consciousness”;
Clark, Friston and Wilkinson that their version of the PP story attempts
to “lay the groundwork for a substantive, but revisionary, account of
consciousness itself” (Clark et al., 2019, p. 20); and Drayson (2017,
p. 8) that on the PP approach, “conscious perceptual experience is the
product of the entire prediction minimization process: it is determined
by the interactions between top-down and bottom-up information flow
within the entire hierarchy”. Perhaps most significantly, Doerig et al.
(2020) include PP theory in their list of most influential currently de-
bated theories of consciousness. Assessing the extent to which conscious-
ness is systematically related to the explanatory moves of a PP theory,
the central task of this paper, thus seems to be a worthwile exercise.
In the following sections, we focus on contemporary attempts to fit
consciousness into the PP explanatory scheme, and critically assess the
results reached so far.
2. PP and the difference between unconscious and conscious
perception
Does PP has the resources to elucidate, in its own terms, the transi-
tion from unconscious to conscious processing of perceptual contents?
If the answer is yes, than PP is a theory of consciousness on a par with
such worked out approaches as Higher Order Theories (HOT; Brown et
al., 2019; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011; Rosenthal, 2005), Global Neu-
ronal Workspace Theory (GNWT; Dehaene, 2014), or attentional (AIR;
Prinz, 2012) theories of consciousness. All these theories attempt to
explain how mental contents become conscious. The AIR theory gives
the following answer: mental contents become conscious when format-
ted for entry into the working memory. The GNWT gives a different an-
swer: mental contents become conscious by entering into the global neu-
ronal workspace. And according to the HOT theory, mental contents be-
come conscious when appropriately represented by higher-order mental
states.
What is the PP theory's answer to this central question? To begin
with, some teams report that there is an intimate link between some of
1 In the following, we use the term “consciousness” in the sense of perceptual conscious-
ness. We are interested in the mechanisms of the transition between nonconscious and
conscious perception of visual, auditory and other contents. We do not enter into debates
about “access consciousness” in the sense of Block (1995). We are not interested in how
conscious contents become reportable, available to memory and other specialized cogni-
tive systems, etc.
the principles postulated by PP theories and the actual contents of
conscious perception. For instance, it has been argued that when sen-
sory input is ambiguous, anticipations bias the experienced contents by
reducing or ignoring perceptual noise: stimuli are seen as moving, as
belonging to a particular object category, etc. in consonance with what
is expected to be perceived (de Lange et al., 2018; O'Callaghan et
al., 2017; Panichello et al., 2013). In such cases, it might be argued,
predictive hypotheses impose a perceptual interpretation on signals that
do not contradict it. Furthermore, perceptual expectations improve per-
ceptual metacognition. Sherman et al. (2015) manipulated perceptual
expectations by changing the probability that a Gabor stimulus would
be presented. Metacognitive sensitivity to the presented stimuli, deter-
mined in a standard way as the trial-by-trial correspondence between
subjective confidence and objective performance accuracy, increased for
expectation-congruent as compared to expectation-incongruent percep-
tual judgements. Other results indicate different but equally intimate
cooperation of PP mechanisms and the mechanisms of consciousness:
anticipated stimuli are detected or identified faster than neutral or un-
predicted ones (Melloni et al., 2011; Pinto et al., 2015). Although
the speed of processing is not necessarily a component of a PP expla-
nation, this might, again, be taken in stride by the PP theory, in the
following manner. Stimuli anticipated via internal perceptual models
are processed faster and get into conscious stream sooner than neutral
and unpredictable ones (although see Mudrik et al., 2011, for results
suggesting the opposite conclusion: unexpected stimuli break into con-
sciousness faster than the predictable ones).
However, disambiguation and accelerated processing of stimuli can
be in place before conscious processing begins. Using a distinction that
got entrenched in consciousness studies (Aru et al., 2012), it is plau-
sible that the mechanisms of disambiguation and acceleration belong to
the prerequisites of consciousness, not to the genuine neural substrate of
conscious processing. Prerequisites of consciousness of the mentioned
sort are the mechanisms that gate the perceptual contents or partici-
pate in their construction, but then pass them on to other structures that
make them conscious.
2.1. PP as a genuine mechanism of consciousness? The constitutive claims
Some theorists offer an account of PP that promises to go beyond
prerequisites of consciousness. They propose what might be called a con-
stitutive claim of the relation between predictive processing and con-
scious perception: predictive processing constitutes the mechanism of
transition from unconscious to conscious perception. In this section, we
scrutinize their claims in more detail.
A constitutive PP claim tries to fill the gap between unconscious and
conscious processing with the conceptual resources proprietary to the PP
theory. The tenets of PP relevant in this context are: the nervous system
has at its disposal an internal model of anticipatory perceptual hypothe-
ses about the causes of incoming sensory inputs. Sensory signal is dealt
with through inference generating perceptual hypotheses with the high-
est probability, for these hypotheses best explain the incoming signals.
If the actually obtaining sensory inputs do not match with anticipations,
the model-dependent hypothesis is updated by adapting itself to accom-
modate prediction errors.
We consider two PP claims that try to illuminate the transition from
unconscious to conscious processing. Each of these claims emphasizes a
different aspect of predictive processing. The first claim considers con-
sciousness as the result of inferential updating of perceptual hypotheses
about the world. The second claim considers consciousness as a mosaic
of perceptual hypotheses with the highest overall probability.
2.1.1. Consciousness as inferential updating
Some PP theorists hint that the procedure of making perceptual con-
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dictive errors propagated through the processing hierarchy. The claim is
that what is not updated does not become consciously perceived. In this
vein, Hobson and Friston claim consciousness to be “simply the process
of optimizing beliefs through inference” (Hobson & Friston, 2016, p.
251), where “beliefs” are to be understood as perceptual hypotheses and
“inference” as the “formation of probabilistic perceptual hypotheses by
optimizing the sufficient statistics of probability distributions” (Hobson
& Friston, 2014, pp. 7). Howhy concurs: “[I]f there is no prediction
error to explain away, then there is nothing to be aware of” (Hohwy,
2012, p. 6).
This proposal does not lack initial plausibility. It makes sense to view
conscious contents as the results of updates based on the most impor-
tant and salient events outside of us – events that could not be predicted
from the currently applied internal model. Keeping up with unpredicted
aspects of reality is crucial, and where better to deal with such unantic-
ipated environmental challenges than directly in conscious experience.
However, the view has to face a number of objections. The first and sim-
plest objection is that it does not seem to be the case that every con-
scious content is a result of evidential update. When I am looking at a
familiar book in front of me and do not move myself or the book around,
I am not constantly updating my priors on the basis of new evidence;
the same perceptual model is applied throughout yet I do not stop con-
sciously seeing the book.2
Secondly, some perceptual priors are stubborn: they are non-updata-
ble, recalcitrant in the face of new evidence (Yon et al., 2018). Perhaps
the most striking example of stubborn perceptual priors is the visual il-
lusion of the Ames Window (Ames, 1951; Bruno et al., 2006). The
Ames Window, as the name suggest, is a toy window that has a build-in
perspective and rotates slowly in one direction. Windows, prior experi-
ences tell us, are rectangular; the Ames Window is experienced as such
even though it is actually a trapezoid. Moreover, it is rotating in one di-
rection at constant speed but it appears to an observer to slow down,
stop and reverse the direction of its motion in alternating phases. No
matter how much the observers try, they cannot experience the window
shape and motion differently, even if a stick or a pen is added as a ref-
erence point to help the brain break through the illusion. The stick will
unexpectedly pass through the solid frames of the window while the ex-
perience of the strangely moving window will stay the same.3
The Ames Window represents a set of stubborn, non-updatable per-
ceptual priors concerning the shape and the direction of motion of visual
objects. The well-known Hollow Mask Illusion (Gregory, 1973; Gros-
jean et al., 2012) is another example of the same phenomenon. The
observers see a still or a rotating convex face even if they are informed
that they are actually looking at the concave side of the mask. Faces
are convex and this prior drives the perception. In all such cases, the
hardwired or learned constraints on perception are not susceptible to
the standard form of evidential updating. On the updating version of the
constitutive claim, though, perceptual hypotheses expressing stubborn
priors could not become conscious. Such claim appears groundless.
Thirdly, the consciousness-as-updating claim is challenged by infer-
ential updates occurring without the reach of consciousness. Examples
2 One of the reviewers points out that some visual aspects of the perceived book, such
as the letters and words at its cover, may need to be continually updated via saccades and
eye fixations even when we look at the book passively. However, the remaining features
such as shape or colour of the book need not be so updated in passive viewing. Thus, our
point remains valid: updating is not necessary for all consciously perceived visual features.
3 One of the reviewers points out that the illusory effect of the Ames window is achieved
only when the window is passively viewed on a video screen, i.e., only when the possibil-
ity of actively testing the perceptual hypotheses about the movement and the form of the
objects is blocked. This limitation, however, is absent in the stubborn prior that we intro-
duce in the next paragraph in the main text.
can be drawn from research on auditory perception. Studies on unex-
pected stimulus omissions indicate that neural responses in the auditory
cortex are shaped by expectations. The neural responses in beat percep-
tion, to give one example, rely on pattern expectations. Omission in a
predictable rhythm generates a MEG-detectable transient oscillation in
the gamma band (Fujioka et al., 2009). Given that gamma activations
are tentatively associated with prediction errors (see Heilbron & Chait,
2018, for a critical review), we can treat these early neural responses as
prediction error minimization processes.
This sort of predictive updating, though, may not result in conscious
perception of the omission. This is clearly seen in congenital amusia sub-
jects. Beat deafness is one variant of this perceptual disorder. Beat-deaf
individuals are unable to detect beat omissions and irregularities, or
treat irregular beat sequences as regular. However, their early ERP-com-
ponents such as the mismatch negativity response (MMNr) are typically
intact (Mathias et al., 2016). Unconsciously, they remain neurally
quite sensitive to unexpected changes in pitch (Moreau et al., 2013,
report that amusics neurally respond to violations from expected sound
pitch as small as one eighth of a tone; see also Tillmann et al., 2015,
pp. 600–601). The detection failures and poor behavioral performance
in beat-deaf individuals and other amusics suggest the lack of conscious
awareness of the various auditory violations, but their neural updating
mechanisms remain intact and active. If we accept that the MMNr is a
neural index of updating, we must conclude that updating of auditory
hypotheses and discharging of prediction errors may, in congenital amu-
sics, occur entirely unconsciously.
Hobson et al. (2014) mitigate this type of objection by stressing
that consciousness pertains only to the higher levels of the presumed
hierarchy of generative internal models. For instance, simple motor re-
flexes successfully discharge prediction errors and revert the body to
pre-set proprioceptive equilibrium without the need to consult the con-
sciousness of a subject. This solution acknowledges that consciousness
cannot give a place to every sensory hypothesis. If what we consciously
experience wasn't heavily filtered, with only a fragment of perceptual
hypotheses becoming conscious, we would soon be overloaded with too
many updated hypotheses ranging from lowest levels of predictive hi-
erarchy to the highest. Furthermore, as Spratling (2016) notes, many
low-level prediction errors will be simply discarded as uninformative.
Giving a place to them in consciousness would not only be unnecessary
but could lead us astray.
The problem with this hierarchy-based solution is that it is not clear
how to demarcate the distinct levels of the supposed hierarchy of gener-
ative models, and why should one think that only the higher levels mat-
ter for consciousness. The PP hierarchy, it seems to us, does not neatly
map onto the more traditional hierarchies such as the hierarchy of pro-
cessing areas within the visual system, ranging from early regions such
as V1 and V2 to the inferior temporal areas and beyond. The PP hierar-
chy lacks consciousness at its lower levels, but it is simply not true that
the contents expressed at the early stages of the standard visual hierar-
chy are never conscious. We are conscious of low-level features such as
textures or colours of objects. Informative specification of the nature of
the PP hierarchy of generative models would thus be needed to ascer-
tain that the proposed hierarchical solution works systematically, and is
not just an unmotivated ad hoc move.
Finally, the consciousness-as-updating story is inconsistent with in-
stances of conscious perception arising without any inferential updates.
One such class of instances is constituted by illusory conscious experi-
ences driven by predictive context. An example of the such top-down
generated illusion is the well-known Kanizsa illusion, where a triangular
shape is perceived even in regions of the image lacking the bottom-up
visual evidence for it. The firing activity of neurons in the primary vi-
sual cortex with a receptive field on the illusory contour is increased
when we look at the Kanizsa triangle. Such illusory experiences are
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visual regions with larger receptive fields to deep infragranular layers
of the primary visual cortex (Aitken et al., 2020; Kok et al., 2016).
Illusory percepts are generated there without any possibility of update
from the bottom-up prediction error signals, for these signals (for non-il-
lusory percepts) travel via pyramidal neurons located in the granular,
and especially supragranular layers of the primary cortex (Bastos et
al., 2012; Mumford, 1992). Provided that inferential updates require
a confrontation of predictive feedback and error signals, the conscious-
ness-as-update claim cannot be right. Illusory conscious percepts com-
pletely bypass the inferential update machinery.
All in all, the version of constitutive claim drawing on the notion of
evidential updating does not seem to be successful.
2.1.2. Contents of consciousness fixed by the hypothesis with the highest
posterior probability
It could be objected that we read too much into the claims of Hob-
son, Friston and Hohwy. Maybe they do not want to say that actually oc-
curring evidential updating of hypotheses is what converts unconscious
contents to conscious ones. Perhaps they just want to convey the idea
that conscious perception is fixed by hypotheses with the highest over-
all posterior probability. Thus, Howhy writes: “[A]ssume now that con-
scious perception is determined by the prediction or hypothesis with the
highest overall posterior probability” (Hohwy, 2012, p. 4). In a similar
vein, Hobson and Friston claim that conscious perception results from
the attempts to find “the best (in a Bayes optimal sense) probabilistic ex-
planation for our sensorium” (Hobson & Friston, 2014, p. 7). Howhy
(2012) calls the hypothesis with the highest posterior probability the
“winning hypothesis”; we follow suit.
This reading bypasses one of the main objections we raised to the
previous constitutive claim. According to the present constitutive claim,
the book or any other static and unchanging perceptual object will stay
in consciousness even though there are no prediction errors to be dealt
with. A winning hypothesis that I see a book in front of me is produced
by my generative internal model, and this hypothesis alone fixes what I
actually see. No updating of my perceptual “belief” is needed. The inter-
nal model simply chooses what it takes to be the best possible “guess” of
the environmental objects and events, and in some cases, this might be
enough to fix conscious contents. But the point of the second constitu-
tive claim is not that evidential updating is not involved in determining
what we perceive. Rather, the point is that it is not the updating that
drives the transition from unconscious to conscious seeing, but only the
winning hypothesis itself.
The internal model-based guessing can diverge from the veridical in-
terpretation of the perceptual scene. Take the well-known phenomenon
of fata morgana. Under conditions of temperature inversion the brain
hypothesises that the object on the horizon is a body of water, a moun-
tain, a building or even a flying ship. No matter how certain we are that
there is nothing like that over there in the distance, the brain will remain
persistent in its selection of perceptual contents. Other examples of the
same principle are given below in Fig. 1. Most people who have never
seen the pictures before will have the following visual experiences: man
riding an elephant, a small lying cow, and a herd of very small dinosaurs
running from left to right. Time, patience and repeated inspection is
needed to realize that the first picture is actually of a well-camouflaged
buffalo, the second of a dog with his mazzle up, and the third picture
captures a small herd of Nasua nasua running in the opposite direction.
Although the majority of the PP literature addresses visual percep-
tion, top-down guidance by a preferred perceptual hypothesis is, of
course, not limited to it. Let us take an example from the auditory do-
main, drawn from the studies of so-called phantom words (Deutsch,
2019, ch. 7). Two loudspeakers are put to the left and right of the
listener, each loudspeaker repeatedly producing the same sequence of
two words or a single two-syllable word, over and over. The sequence
Fig. 1. The brain picks its best possible perceptual guess in accordance with incoming sen-
sory signal and presents such hypothesis as the content of consciousness. – The pictures are
in the common domain and are used under the fair use principle.
is offset in time in the loudspeakers: when the first word (or the first
syllable) is coming from the left loudspeaker, the second word (or the
second syllable) is coming from the right loudspeaker (and vice versa).
At first, the listener is confronted with a jumble of chaotic sounds. Af-
ter some time, though, words and phrases are heard. When presented
with the word nowhere, people tend to hear phantom words such as
window, welcome, love me, run away, no brain, and others (Deutsch,
2019, p. 107). In a PP perspective, this may be interpreted as a process
in which the brain draws on the predictive generative model and uses
the best guesses to explain away the jumble signal (in the same fash-
ion as in the pictures in Fig. 1). This interpretation can be further sup-
ported by the fact that people tend to report hearing phantom words in
their native language (Deutsch, 2019, p. 107), and are influenced by
the presently meaningful context, such as being on diet and hearing the
phantom words “diet coke” or “feel fat” (ibid., p. 108).
Even more dramatic effects of the winning hypothesis can be demon-
strated on various psychopathologies such as hallucinations. In these
cases, the winning hypothesis is produced independently of the sensory
input, or only with a very tenuous reference to this input. As a result,
we perceive things that have no counterparts in the external world (see
Adams et al., 2014; Sterzer et al., 2018). In a controlled setting, sim-
ilar effects can to some extent be induced even in healthy subjects (Aru
et al., 2018).
Howhy (2012) further specifies that precision and accuracy are to
be taken into account. Precision concerns the varying reliability and
noise of the incoming sensory signal. Prediction errors generated by
a highly reliable and crisp signal are accorded high precision by the
model, while unreliable signals are treated with more caution. Incom-
ing sensory signal may be considered so unreliable that the predic-
tive model is not updated by it; instead, the model sticks to a strong
prior. Accuracy is the measure of how well a perceptual hypothesis or
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causal relations. In PP terms, more accurate hypotheses and models bet-
ter supress prediction errors. Howhy adds that although a very complex
model might have a broader predictive power than a simpler one, ade-
quately capturing more aspects or details of what is perceived, it is un-
desirable to have unwieldy and overly complex models. High accuracy
therefore needs to be balanced by considerations of simplicity and eco-
nomic management of resources.
There are no a priori constraints on how much a winning hypothesis
needs to be precise or accurate to be consciously perceived. Rather, it is
a matter of opportunistic trade-offs between these two dimensions. We
typically perceive the contents having both high accuracy and precision,
but it is not strictly necessary. We do not loose the ability of conscious
perception in contexts involving highly unreliable inputs, and likewise
the contents of consciousness are sometimes representationally inaccu-
rate (recall the three pictures at Fig. 1). But the actual manner of how
these trade-offs are reached is immaterial to our present purposes. What
matters is just the fact that we consciously perceive a hypothesis with
what is internally considered the best probabilistic fit, all things consid-
ered.
Putting the threads of the previous paragraphs together, we can say
that the second constitutive claim promotes the idea that a posterior hy-
pothesis that is taken to embody the currently optimal trade-off between
precision and accuracy fixes what we consciously perceive. We will call
this idea WHC (standing for “Winning Hypothesis is Conscious”). As in
the case of the first constitutive claim, this picture has to face serious
objections. The objections we review below use various sources of evi-
dence but all point to the possibility that the winning hypothesis need
not reach consciousness.
First, Vetter et al. (2014) experimentally demonstrated that suc-
cessful predictions in some cases do not terminate in conscious percep-
tion. Vetter et al. used the paradigm of apparent motion. In their exper-
iment, the prediction of apparent motion was on some trials generated
even if the illusory motion was not perceived consciously. During the ex-
periment, illusory apparent motion was induced by flashing two white
squares in rapid succession at different locations. Parallel to this, a target
was flashed on the apparent motion trace. On some trials, the flashing of
the target was fully synchronized with the illusory motion token, fitting
the spatiotemporal prediction. On other trials, targets were flashed out
of sync with the token. The subjects were asked to indicate two things:
whether they consciously perceived the apparent motion and whether
they detected the target. The results show that the detection of targets
was better on trials with in time prediction-fitting targets, and that for
some (higher) frequencies of the apparent motion-inducing squares this
was true for both cases when the subjects consciously perceived the ap-
parent motion and when they did not. Vetter et al. conclude that predic-
tions accurately anticipating the unfolding of events are sometimes suc-
cessfully formed without entering consciousness. Such a possibility, even
if it may concern only a minority of perceptual situations, casts doubt
on the WHC idea. If some winning hypotheses will not make it to con-
sciousness, just being the winning hypothesis might not be sufficient be-
ing perceived consciously (though it might be necessary).
Further evidence against the WHC idea is afforded by neuropsycho-
logical deficits such blindsight (Pöppel et al., 1973; Sanders et al.,
1974; Weiskrantz et al., 1974). Blindsight subjects with lesions in
the V1 visual area are able to partially process stimuli in their blind
fields without conscious experience, and to adjust their behaviour ac-
cordingly. At least to a certain degree: they partly retain the ability to
distinguish colours, shapes, to grab objects, and even to catch them.
If encouraged, they can navigate the room without hitting objects. As
Dołęga and Dewhurst (2020) remark, the visual system of blindsight
subjects seems to form imprecise but sufficiently distinct perceptual hy-
potheses about the objects present in the blind field. These hypotheses
are able to guide behaviour to some extent, and we thus have every
right to treat them as the hypotheses with the highest overall posterior
probability. Given that these hypotheses are unconscious, blindsight and
other similar neuropsychological deficits (such as the unilateral neglect
– see Vallar & Perani, 1986) are counterexamples to the WHC idea.
Dołęga and Dewhurst conclude that the WHC idea cannot on its own ex-
plain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception.
The same conclusion can be reached even without appeal to percep-
tual pathologies. Recall the view of Friston and Hobson that events at
the presumed lower levels of the perceptual hierarchy, such as motor re-
flexes, are successfully executed without the involvement of conscious-
ness. If we accept this view, it again spells trouble for the WHC idea.
It is plausible to view the reflexes as being guided by sufficiently accu-
rate and precise winning hypotheses. The winning hypotheses at the pre-
sumed lower levels are therefore dissociated from consciousness. They
do not become conscious just in virtue of being winning posteriors. Fur-
ther conditions need to be met.
Continuous flash suppression (CFS; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005) is the
experimental paradigm similar in some aspects to the more known para-
digm of binocular rivalry (Blake & Logothetis, 2002). In both of these
inter-ocular paradigms two different stimuli are presented to each eye
separately. In case of the CFS, one stimulus (an arrow, for instance)
is presented to one eye while the other eye is stimulated with highly
salient and constantly changing patterns of shapes (“Mondrians”). Both
paradigms are based on the phenomenon of neural rivalry. There is a
competition between underlying neural processes in which one of the
perceptual versions becomes dominant and enters the stream of con-
sciousness. During binocular rivalry, the versions of both eyes sponta-
neously alternate in consciousness. During CFS, however, the flashing
Mondrians render the pattern presented to the other eye unconscious
for long periods. The suppressed pattern is the winning perceptual hy-
pothesis correctly reflecting the input to the respective eye. It can prime
responses while being kept entirely out of consciousness (Koivisto &
Grassini, 2018; Yang et al., 2014). The fact that it is kept out of con-
sciousness proves, once again, that more is needed for conscious percep-
tion than just the emergence of the winning hypothesis.
The arguments marshalled in this section show that the second con-
stitutive claim, based on the winning hypothesis idea, fails too. It can-
not explain the transition from unconscious to conscious processing. The
processes of which PP speaks can be, at least in some circumstances,
completed without terminating in conscious perception. The idea nat-
urally suggests itself: the true mechanisms of consciousness, although
closely cooperating with the PP mechanisms, are dissociable from them.
PP mechanisms participate in the processes in which the perceptual con-
tents are prepared to be expressed in consciousness, but then pass these
contents to other mechanisms that turn them into conscious contents.
The latter mechanisms form a set of jointly sufficient neural conditions
that need to be met if the contents are to enter the ongoing stream of
consciousness, and to remain within it at least for a short period of time.
If these mechanisms are not recruited, the contents remain unconscious.
3. PP and other theories of consciousness
The preceding sections show that the PP theory cannot explain, in
its proprietary terms, how perceptual contents become conscious. To be-
come a genuine theory of consciousness, the PP theory must be supple-
mented by new explanatory principles directly relevant for conscious-
ness. Alternatively, it must find a way to closely align itself with a differ-
ent theory that accounts for consciousness-conferring mechanisms. The
latter strategy is, of course, less ambitious than the first one, for the
heavy lifting of explaining consciousness is done by this independently
formulated theory. Given the absence of the more ambitious proposals
of the first kind, though, we will focus on examples of the latter kind of
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It has been suggested that there are interesting points of contact be-
tween PP and the Information Integration Theory (Bucci & Grasso,
2017), that PP theory can be augmented with Dennett's theory of Mul-
tiple Drafts to account for consciousness (Dołęga & Dewhurst, 2020),
or that Prinz's attentional AIR theory and the PP theory both locate con-
scious contents at the intermediate levels of the perceptual hierarchy
(Marchi & Hohwy, 2020). Such attempts to forge links between es-
tablished theories of consciousness and the PP theory are worthwile, of
course, but there is also a danger that PP will align itself with theo-
ries that give competing and mutually exclusive accounts of what makes
perceptual contents conscious. A better strategy, it seems, is to select
one particular theory of consciousness and show how the PP account
can join its forces with it. This has been done most extensively with the
Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT), to which we now turn.
GNWT is a leading neurobiological theory of consciousness sup-
ported by impressive amount of evidence (for the review of which see
Dehaene, 2014). Hohwy (2013) leads the way in sketching how to
integrate GNWT and PP into a unified account. GNWT does not in any
important way rely on predictions, so Hohwy's proposed extension of it
is genuinely novel. It is supposed to work like this. (1) The explanation
of how perceptual contents enter the conscious stream is secured by the
GNWT itself: contents get conscious by entering the prefronto-parietal
neuronal “workspace”, and staying within it for at least a short while. By
entering the workspace and staying within it, contents become available
to various consumer subsystems; this is what makes them conscious. (2)
Entry into the workspace is a matter of its non-linear ignition. Dehaene
(2009) speculates that ignition is triggered when a threshold of uncon-
scious evidence accumulation for a perceptual state is crossed in the
process that involves both bottom-up sensory activation and top-down
amplification of the sensory signals from the frontal areas. Hohwy notes
that such a proposal might be easily translated into the PP terms.
In particular, Hohwy suggests that ignition of the GNW typically hap-
pens in the switch between perceptual and active inference (Hohwy,
2013, p. 214). Active inference is the agent's intervention in the world
designed to minimize the prediction error not by adjusting the internal
model, but by modifying the sensory input by appropriately acting on
the world. The active inference idea modifies the GNWT in that the ig-
nition of a subset of workspace neurons is needed for the winning hy-
pothesis to be made available for various consumer systems specifically
in the context of acting. Acting needs to take into account various op-
tions, select some course of action among them, and stick to it. When the
workspace is ignited, the perceptual hypothesis entering it becomes con-
scious, ready to guide the behaviour as it unfolds in time. Once in the
ignited workspace, the selected hypothesis may drive further descending
predictions of the sensory input necessary for adaptive action.4
This attempt to tie conscious perception and action so closely to-
gether might be criticised in the following manner. Most of the time,
our conscious perceptual field contains a vast number of presentations
that are irrelevant form the point of view of acting.5 We consciously see
buildings and airplanes in the distance, hear noises around us etc., but
4 We note that this is consonant with recent experiments indicating that some contents
can influence the generation of new top-down predictions only by first becoming conscious
(Meijs et al., 2018).
5 We speak here about acting in the sense of intentional interventions in the world
guided by specific action policies. Eye fixations of external objects and other mostly sub-
liminal behaviors subserving perception are not actions in this sense. They can be used to
gather new perceptual information about objects and thus to inform perception via pre-
diction errors. But they have an opposite direction of fit than policies guiding active infer-
ence. We use these policies to intervene in the world in order to make it conform to our
predictions, not to gather new perceptual information.
do not in any way interact with these buildings, airplanes or noises. The
relation to active inference could therefore at best concern only a small
subset of global workspace contents, not the totality of them. Launching
actions seems neither sufficient nor necessary for perceptual contents to
become conscious.
Whyte (2019) attempts to take Hohwy's predictive extension of
the GNWT one notch further. Drawing in particular on Hohwy et al.
(2008), he asks: What if the global workspace itself has a predictive or-
ganization? In Hohwy's rendering, the minimization of prediction errors
occurs before the contents enter the workspace. Once in the GW, they
do not behave according to predictive principles anymore. As we have
seen, Hohwy insists that the hypothesis in the GW must remain stable
enough to be able to guide specific behaviours. According to Whyte's
Predictive Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (PGNWT), the architec-
ture that underwrites the global workspace is continuous with the in-
ferential processes of the preconscious perceptual hierarchy: the global
workspace itself is engaged in a process of hierarchical prediction error
minimization. In particular, Whyte argues that prediction errors accu-
mulated at the lowest levels of the perceptual hierarchy may continue
to influence the global distribution of contents in the workspace (which
on the GNWT amounts to their being consciously perceived; see section
4.2. of Whyte's 2019 paper for technical details).
Whyte propounds an interpretation of the literature on auditory odd-
ball paradigms that is consistent with the hypothesis that the global neu-
ronal workspace itself has a PP structure. If further corroborated by fu-
ture studies, the PGNWT will successfully intertwine perceptual infer-
ence and prediction error minimization with the genuine neural sub-
strate of consciousness (provided, that is, that GNWT is the correct the-
ory of consciousness; for recent evidence that this may not be the case,
see Silverstein et al., 2015; Scott et al., 2018). Suppose that one day
this really happens: the PGNWT is robustly supported by evidence. Still,
this would not mean that consciousness can be completely explained by
PP principles. The mechanism of content distribution in the global work-
space, on which the PNGWT piggybacks, will remain the main explana-
tions of how contents become conscious.
A different option is to expand the PP theory with a metacognitive
theory of perceptual consciousness. As Hohwy & Seth, (forthcoming)
remark, the PP system can incorporate the metacognitive element in the
continuous attempts to refine ʻhigher-level expected precisionsʼ. That is,
the PP system is constantly engaged in high-level monitoring of the fluc-
tuations in precisions of its first-order perceptual signals. The goal is to
identify regularities in these fluctuations, so that the system may learn
to predict future changes in first-order precisions.
The approach of Hohwy & Seth, is in some respects similar to
the ideas of Axel Cleeremans. Cleeremans systematically connects con-
sciousness and learning and gives his theory of conscious awareness a
metacognitive twist. The idea is that availability to consciousness de-
pends on the extent to which a first-order sensory representation be-
comes an object of representation for further systems of representa-
tion (i.e., meta-representations). Cleeremans calls this process represen-
tational redescription. Through it, unconscious first-order representa-
tions become objects of representation by being indexed or targeted
by metarepresentations (Cleeremans et al., 2020). The brain learns
to meta-represent its own first-order states to itself, to ‘make them ex-
plicit to itself’, and this the basis of consciousness (see also Cleeremans,
2011).
The theory of Cleeremans incorporates metacognitive predictions as
one of its elements. The proces of representational redescription essen-
tially involves the ability of the higher-order representations to predict
how activations of one part of the brain systematically influence acti-
vations in another part of the brain (see the example of Supplemen-
tary Motor Area and Primary Motor Cortex activations in Cleeremans,
2011, p. 10). However, this predictive colouring is not what makes this
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tivity in one part of the brain influences activity in another part of the
brain (and further downstream) can all be carried non-consciously. It is
the emergence of full-blown higher-order representations, not their pre-
dictive nature, that accounts for the emergence of conscious experience
on this theory. Only when the brain learns to represent its own repre-
sentational states to itself, it becomes conscious.
4. The phenomenal challenge
Can the PP theory aspire to elucidate why experienced contents have
the phenomenal character they do? Hohwy proposes that if we start
with conscious experience as we know it intimately from the first per-
son, we can use the PP explanatory framework to account for some of
its striking features. First, conscious experience is unified. We normally
do not get to consciously perceive disjointed contents. The contents are
bound together both at the local level and at the global level. (i) At
the global level, all conscious contents are always part of the unified
perceptual field. Hohwy's PP theory explains the unified nature of the
perceptual field as a direct result of the fact that perceptual inference
is geared to action (see the previous section 2.2). Action can only be
successful if no more than one of the perceptual hypotheses is selected
for uptake into consciousness via active inference (see Hohwy, 2013,
chap. 5, for further details). Since we can only act consistently if the se-
lected hypothesis is unified, no other unifying work is needed. (ii) At
the local level, colours, shapes, textures etc. of objects are “bound” to-
gether; we do not get to perceive colour first and texture later, or colours
and textures not attached to the object to which they belong. Again,
Hohwy thinks that the bound nature of consciously perceived objectual
features springs directly from the way the PP explanation is build. The
perceptual hypotheses generated by internal models are bound by their
very nature; there is no need for a separate dedicated mechanism that
would provide the feature binding. (iii) The third aspect of phenomenal
character allegedly amenable to PP treatment is the sophisticated mix-
ture of high-level, relatively stable perceptual features, and lower-level,
fast-changing features (constrained by the more stable high-level ones,
presumably by some form of a neural feedback). I see a book remain-
ing a book (high-level stable feature) under a lot of perceptual variation
(low-level fast-changing features) when I move around while looking at
it; its surface colours change, its shape and precise distance from my
eyes change etc., but perceptually it remains a book. The PP vision of
levels of hierarchical internal generative models seems to fit well with
this organization of conscious perception.
On this interesting proposal we have three comments. First, the ex-
periential features (i)–(iii) are structural features. They all concern the
systematic interrelations or groupings of the various contents we con-
sciously perceive. But phenomenal features are, rather, qualitative: the
distinctive subjective “feel” of consciously experienced smells, pains or
colours. It is not clear how the predictive processing architecture might
help explain such qualitative features and our experience of them. To
be fair, a theory of consciousness need not aspire to elucidate the phe-
nomenal aspects of perception. The GNWT is an example of a theory
that purports to explain how contents enter the stream of consciousness,
without saying anything about how their phenomenality is generated.
But we take it that PP is a more ambitious type of theory (see Clark,
2016, p. 239; Hohwy, 2012, p. 9). It promises to illuminate perceptual
phenomenology, or at least some of its salient aspects. So far it has not
delivered on the promise (although see Dennett, 2015, Clark, 2018,
and Clark, 2019, for some initial ideas about how the PP models could
tackle some of the qualitative aspects of experience).
Our second comment is that all theories of conscious vision known to
us accept that there is a hierarchy of distinct processing levels, ranging
from lower to higher ones. Explaining the mixture of high- and low-level
perceptual features by appealing to a perceptual hierarchy thus is
not an innovation of PP theories (see, e.g., Hochstein & Ahissar,
2002).
Third, Hohwy seems to hold that the structural perceptual features
(i)–(iii) only occur at the level of consciousness. But that may not be the
case. Starting with (iii), the level-based stratification of perceptual con-
tents: there is ample evidence that we can unconsciously perceive both
many low-level phenomena such as colours, brightness, orientation, sim-
ple shapes, textures and motion, as well as the higher-level phenomena
such as shapes in their semantic aspect, permitting the categorization of
objects (Prinz, 2017). Arguments for unconscious feature binding (ii)
are equally convincing. Prinz reviews evidence for double dissociation
between binding and consciousness (Prinz, 2012, pp. 37f.). Perception
might be bound during a completely unconscious perceptual process,
such as during episodes of masked priming, while, on the other hand,
some instances of conscious perception occur in unbound form. The lat-
ter option is documented by cases when the stimuli are presented too
quickly to be properly bound together (although they do enter conscious
stream), or when the subject is afflicted with a perceptual disorder such
as associative agnosia.
It is less certain that the first structural feature of experience, the
global unity of the perceptual field, can be present unconsciously. It
would be controversial to declare that the whole of the perceptual field
can be unified already before its contents reach consciousness. The ev-
idence is very limited so far. Here we only note that Mudrik et al.
(2011) present results indicating that subjects are able to integrate per-
ceptual elements into a meaningful scene without the benefit of con-
scious awareness. Such unconscious unification goes far beyond local
binding of perceptual features to objects. Notice also that Hohwy's own
explanation of how perceptual hypotheses become conscious (via active
inference) seem to presuppose a robust form of global unity at the un-
conscious level. A perceptual hypothesis can guide action only if unified;
no consistent course of action can be derived from a disjointed hypothe-
sis. But if the hypothesis is to trigger the ignition of the global neuronal
workspace, and thus become conscious, it must be unified already at the
preconscious level. On Hohwy's own account, then, consciousness is not
needed for the perceptual field to be unified (at least as much unified as
is required by successfully acting on the world).
In sum, if the structural aspects (i)–(iii) of perceptual states do not
appear only at the conscious level, but can be in place already before
consciousness emerges, we are back with the idea, mooted at the begin-
ning of section 2, that mechanisms realizing such features belong to the
category of the prerequisites of perceptual consciousness (see also Aru
et al., 2016, p. 8).
5. Whatever next with the PP theory of consciousness?
The arguments of this paper show that optimistic claims of some
of the PP theorists about consciousness are unsubstantiated. PP theory
cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception
or illuminate the phenomenal dimensions of experience in its propri-
etary terms, drawing on prediction error minimization or the emergence
of the winning posterior hypothesis. It is not clear that PP contributes
to the explanation of conscious perception beyond identifying some of
the candidate prerequisites of conscious perception. The prerequisites of
consciousness are the processes preparing and poising perceptual con-
tents for uptake into awareness, but this uptake is secured by other types
of mechanisms. It is these other mechanisms that a genuine theory of
consciousness must be attempting to isolate and describe.
As noted, PP theorists are currently exploring ways to join forces
with other respectable theories of consciousness, most notably with
the GNWT. One project for the immediate future would thus be to
strengthen the entwinement of PP and GNWT (or other theory of con-
sciousness). The resulting theory, if empirically convincing, could be so
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possible to object that PP account of consciousness rely too much on
non-proprietary ideas. Another project would be to work on a fortified
PP theory, immune to the objections summarized in this paper. In either
case, a canonical version of PP's take on consciousness would be most
welcome. At present, various versions of the PP theory are in circulation,
emphasizing different aspects or invoking different explanatory princi-
ples (see the differences in accounts of Hobson & Friston, 2014, Ho-
hwy, 2013, and Clark, 2019).6
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